El libro Kants Vorlesungen/Kants Lectures reúne un conjunto de trabajos que fueron elaborados a partir de la presentación y discusión de los mismos en el VIII. Kant Kolloquium que tuvo lugar en Marilia, Brasil, entre el 18 al 21 de agosto de 2013. Tal como lo indica su título, su objeto de estudio está constituido por las Lecciones o clases dictadas por Kant, las que constituyen un testimonio de la actividad pública del filósofo y una fuente fundamental para el estudio (...) de la evolución de su pensamiento, ya que profundizan, complejizan y complementan aspectos de su doctrina, tal como la conocemos a través de sus obras publicadas. Los trabajos se orientan según distintas líneas de investigación: histórica y especulativo-conceptual. El texto brinda abundante material para el estudio del pensamiento de Kant, tanto respecto a las fuentes, como a la discusión con los filósofos de la época y, también, con respecto a la elaboración de su propio pensamiento, que él mismo ha ido efectuando en la medida en que exponía los temas y los autores. Los trabajos están escritos, algunos en inglés y otros en alemán. El libro nuclea a destacados investigadores de América y Europa y comienza exponiendo los elementos históricos fundamentales para ubicar las Lecciones en el conjunto del pensamiento de Kant. (shrink)

O que se segue é uma apresentação e a tradução de Das Ziel alles Lebens ist der Tod - Schopenhauer und Freuds Todestrieb, de Marcel Zentner, publicado em: RAINER, Specht. Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1993, vol. 75, p. 319 – 340. Trata-se de um detalhamento dos problemas que envolvem o tópos criado por Freud de que, com seu dualismo dos instintos de vida e de morte, exposto em Além do princípio do prazer, “desaguara (...) no porto da filosofia de Schopenhauer”. As diferenças fundamentais desse dualismo com a dicotomia schopenhaueriana da afirmação e negação da Vontade merecem um esclarecimento pormenorizado – defende Zentner, para que não se perca de vista o fato de que a principal antecipação schopenhaueriana de Freud concerne, antes, ao complexo conceitual articulado em torno à primeira teoria dos instintos, a teoria da repressão e o “modelo estrutural da psique”. (shrink)

Inchoate crime consists of acts that are regarded as crimes despite the fact that they are only partial or incomplete in some respect. This includes acts that do not succeed in physically harming the victim or are only indirectly related to such a result. Examples include attempts (as in attempted murder that does not eventuate in the killing of anyone), conspiracy (in which case the crime has only been planned, not yet acted out) and incitement (where the inciter does not (...) himself commit the crime he is urging others to undertake). The present paper attempts to analyze these inchoate crimes from a libertarian perspective, based on the non-aggression principle. (shrink)

Establishing a link between phenomenology and hermeneutics as seen by philosophers and as applied by students of religion is the pioneering aim of this book. No existing book ties together the cross-disciplinary strands in a way that is useful for religious studies. A phenomenological and therefore hermeneutical approach to religion "prides itself on being aware of its own presuppositions and those of others that are brought to bear on data to be interpreted." Thus it "seeks to gain an access to (...) the religious worlds of other peoples in as pure a form as possible." Phenomenological hermeneutics differs from the traditional comparative study of religion in an important way: the new method attempts an empathic understanding of religious experiences before making any comparisons or drawing any inferences. Part I shows how the phenomenological approach must arise from a "crisis of doubt within the prevailing tradition." It goes on to compare this approach to the mystics' understanding of the "scope and limitations of rational consciousness," contrasting it with the nominalists' dichotomy between faith and reason. Part II starts with Eliade's "creative hermeneutics," which holds that an object or an act becomes real only insofar as it imitates or repeats an archetype, particularly the archetype of the sacred. It goes on to develop Cassirer's point that "myth is a particular way of seeing." Part Ill starts by showing how art, like religion, is an "imitation of an archetype." It goes on to apply hermeneutical phenomenology to the interpretation of ritual. "Ritual gesture," Chapter 6 argues, "thematizes the world," establishing a mystical symbolic relationship between body and world, the seen and the unseen. Part Ill continues with a critique of the writings of Carlos Castaneda, arguing that these contain "the symbolic elements of both archaic shamanism and classical mysticism." The final chapter treats the "three-tiered cosmos" that is universal in folklore: the tier of family-home-land-artifacts, the tier of clan-tribe-nation, and the tier of weather-seasons-natural forces, Each tier has its loric power, and these powers are united by shamans and mystics in one sacred "kingdom of power.". (shrink)

Bertrand Russells Buch A Cntical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz bildet einen Meilenstein in der Leibniz-Forschung, vor allem in den angelsächsischen Ländern. In diesem Aufsatz untersuche ich zunächst die Entstehungsgeschichte dieses Werkes (Russells intensive Beschäftigung mit Leibniz anläßlich einer Vorlesung, die Quellen, die Russell benutzt hat, und die Hilfe und Unterstützung, die ihm von Philosophen wie James Ward und G. E. Moore zuteil wurden). Anschließend behandle ich das Echo, das Russells Buch gefunden hat. Am Schluß suche ich Russells Einstellung (...) zu Leibniz' Denken zu verdeutlichen. Dabei berücksichtige ich Russells spätere Werke, soweit sie mit Leibniz in Beziehung stehen. Meine Aufmerksamkeit gilt im besonderen Maß dem Briefwechsel mit Louis Couturat und dem Einfluß, den Couturat auf Russell ausgeübt hat. As an original and critical position regarding Leibniz, Russell's [A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz] is not outdated. It is a work still young, one worked out by the "young Russell", and of fundamental importance for the historical and philosophical investigation of Bertrand Russell's thought. But even more fundamental is what we derive from reading it : the understanding of the history of philosophy in terms of dialogue, where the speculative affinities are properly complemented by that critical perspective which calls into question those divergences which set the limit of philosophical reflections and assess their value circumstantially. (shrink)

ABSTRACT The individual-community relationship has always been one of the most fundamental topics of social sciences. In sociology, this is known as the micro-macro relationship while in economics it refers to the processes, through which, individual actions lead to macroeconomic phenomena. Based on philosophical discourse and systems theory, many sociologists even use the term "emergence" in their understanding of micro-macro relationship, which refers to collective phenomena that are created by the cooperation of individuals, but cannot be reduced to individual actions. (...) "Emergence" theories attempt to explain the nature of society as a complex system by examining how individuals and their relationships lead to the creation of integrated and macro-social phenomena such as markets, educational systems, cultural beliefs, and shared social practices. As a prelude to activity, every researcher has to answer the question from the methodological point of view, how is it possible to study the behavior of social groups and how can we gain knowledge about the laws related to social groups? Anyone who deals with humanities and social sciences or any reality and phenomenon that affects human beings, inevitably deals with the reality that is emerging. In fact, emergence occurs when one level of reality emerges radically from another level. Examples of emergent levels of reality include how the mind emerges from the body; or the way society emerges from human beings. Therefore, when there is an emerging factor, different scientific disciplines should be used, because it is inevitable to talk about social affairs, psychology and neurobiology, as well as physical and even chemical. -/- INTRODUCTION Since its beginning in the 19th century, sociology has faced the fundamental question of what a social phenomena stands for? At a glance, sociologists deal with the study of social groups, collective behavior, institutions, social structures, social networks, and social dynamics, and ultimately all such phenomena are composed of individuals. Therefore, social phenomena seem to have no independent ontological status, and in this case, sociology is ultimately about reducible individuals. Different approaches about the micro-macro relationship, using the concept of "emergence", argue that although collective phenomena are created by individuals, they cannot be reduced to individual action. The term "emergence" is used to distinguish "emergent results" from " Procedural results". Results are called Procedural that can only be calculated by adding or subtracting the causes that act together. On the contrary, they are emergent outcomes that are qualitatively novel compared to the causes from which they originate. An example of such emergent results is mental characteristics that emerge from neural processes, but are not considered among the characteristics of neural processes of components - which are their origin. Philosophical debates about emergentism and reductionism focus on the mind-brain relationship, but as many philosophers have noted, they can be generalized to apply to any hierarchical set of features. The cognitive revolution reactivated a 19th century controversy between theorists of Identity and dualism. The theorists of Identity believe in reductionist materialism and elimination of metaphysics, according to which the mind is nothing more than the biological, while the dualists believe that the mind and the brain are distinct from each other. Emergence has been considered as a third way between the theories of Identity and dualism. -/- METHODOLOGY Interdisciplinarity Is fundamentally indicated by the dominance of open systems as well as social and emerging systems at different levels. Therefore, as long as we are facing a new emergentism, there will necessarily be different fields and an interdisciplinary method. The commonality of social sciences and cognitive sciences on the issue of emergence provides the possibility of interaction and exchange of concepts between these two for deeper research. Therefore, in this research, apart from the concepts of Subvenience and downward causation, we have used multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, which are used to explain the emerging concept in cognitive sciences, including neurobiology, psychology, and philosophy. For analytical and interdisciplinary approaches, after examining the concepts of subvenience, and wildly disjunctive, Individualistic and collectivist emergentism have been reviewed. And then their adequacy is criticized and evaluated in meeting strong emergence conditions. -/- FINDINGS Philosophers of the mind have been able to define the conditions of irreducibility and downward causation, which are essential for strong emergence, by using the principle of subvenience with the help of multiple realization and wildly disjunctive principles. Therefore, by definition, emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and emergentist collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the challenges facing the two methodological approaches of individualism and collectivism leads us to three unresolved issues about the emerging phenomenon, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. Despite the differences in the stances of these two approaches regarding the aforementioned triple problems, individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and some others are irreducible due to their complexity, the determination of which, depends on the case study of the mechanism of emergence of each social characteristic. -/- CONCLUSION An emergence that is consistent with reductionism is called a weak emergence. And strong emergence includes the principle of irreducibility and downward causality. According to strong emergence, the characteristics of social phenomena have downward causal power, which cannot be reduced to the causal forces. The principle of subvenience, together with multiple realization and wildly disjunctive, can provide the conditions of irreducibility and downward causality, which are essential conditions of strong emergence. Based on the philosophical analysis of two methodological approaches, individualist and collectivist, it can be concluded that emergentist individualism suffers from the problem of how to explain downward causality and irreducibility, and reification collectivism faces the challenge of reification. The analysis of the problems faced by these two approaches leads us to three unresolved issues, which are realism, downward causality, and mechanism. individualist emergentists acknowledge the existence of emergent social characteristics, but despite this, they believe that these characteristics are not real but merely analytical constructs that require explanation based on individuals and their mutual actions. But collectivists argue that emergentism yields a categorical ontology and supports social realism. They accept the dependence of social characteristics on individuals, but claim that social entities and structures are ontologically independent. Individualists and collectivists both agree that some social characteristics are reducible; and others are irreducible due to their complexity; and the only way to recognize this is to engage in empirical studies of the mechanisms and temporal processes of "emergence" that create social characteristics. -/- NOVELTY The newness of this compact article is as follows: a) Presenting an interdisciplinary approach using the analysis of philosophy of cognitive sciences, including the philosophy of mind, neurobiology and psychology to formulate the issue of social emergence; b) Criticizing individualist and collectivist methodological approaches to the issue of social emergence and explaining the sufficiency and shortcomings of both in providing weak and strong emerging conditions; c) Explaining and categorizing the challenges facing methodological approaches in explaining the phenomenon of social emergence, in three categories: realism, downward causality, and mechanism. 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